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Identity-Based Quotable Ring Signature
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aCentre for Computer and Information Security Research
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Abstract
We present a new notion of identity-based quotable ring signature. It could be applied for anyone deriving
new ring signatures on substrings of an original message from an original ring signature on the original
message, which is generated by an actual signer included in the ring. No matter whether a signature is
originally generated or is quoted from another valid ring signature, it will convince the verifier that it is
generated by one of the ring members, without revealing any information about which ring member is the
actual signer. The set of signers could be arbitrarily selected by the actual signer without need of other
signers’ approval. The actual signer is anonymous among this set of signers. At the same time, the verifier
could not distinguish whether a signature is originally generated or is quoted from another ring signature. In
this paper, we propose a concrete identity-based quotable ring signature scheme based on bilinear pairing.
We make use of bilinear groups of composite order. The construction is identity-based to alleviate the
problem of certificate verification, especially for applications involving a large number of public keys in
each execution such as ring signature schemes. The proposed scheme is proven to be anonymous under the
assumption that the Subgroup Decision Problem is hard, selectively unforgeable against adaptively chosen
message attacks in the random oracle model under the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard, and strongly context hiding.
Keywords: Identity-based cryptography, quotable signature, ring signature
1. Introduction
In ring signature schemes, the actual signer can choose arbitrary other signers to form a ring that
includes himself. The actual signer anonymously signs messages by using his private key and other users’
public keys on behalf of the whole ring. There is no requirement to get other users’ approval. On one hand,
similar with group signature schemes, the verifier must be convinced that a signature has been generated
by a member of this ring, but could not have better way to identify the actual signer than at random to guess
which member is the actual signer. The actual signer remains completely anonymous. On the other hand,
unlike group signature schemes, there is no group manager, no setup procedure, no revocation procedure,
and no coordination in traditional ring signature. There is no way to revoke the anonymity of the actual
signer. Ring signature schemes can be considered as simplified group signature schemes which consist
of only users without managers. Recently, in order to realize an efficient ring signature scheme provably
secure in the standard model, Shacham and Waters [26] introduced an efficient ring signature scheme by
allowing for a trusted global setup step by an authority.
In ring signature schemes, all ring members’ information serves as a part of the ring signature. In
traditional Public Key Infrastructure, prior to the generation of a ring signature, the actual signer has to
check the validity of public keys of other users which are included in the ring. Similarly, prior to the
verification of a ring signature, the verifier has to check the validity of public keys of all the users in the
ring. This increases both the generation and the verification cost of ring signatures. In identity-based
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setting, introduced by Shamir, it avoids these checks about public keys. In this way, the public keys of
users can be easily and publicly computed from their identities by anyone. This is especially desirable for
applications which involve a large number of public key checks such as ring signature schemes.
Quoting are usually applied to derive a signature on a substring when text messages are signed. It can
also be applied to derive a signature on a subregion of an image when images are signed, such as a face. In
quotable signature schemes, for every substring m′ of a message m, it is possible for a third party to derive
a signature on m′ from a signature on m on behalf of the same signer. Moreover, the derived signature
on m′ reveals no extra information about m, which means the derived signature cannot be distinguished
from a fresh one even when the original signature on m is given. The inability to link derived signatures to
their original sources prevents some practical privacy and linking attacks. It is desirable to allow repeated
computation on the signatures, which means it is possible to quote from a quoted signature. It is also
desirable that the size of the signatures depend only on the size of the object being signed, no matter
whether the signature is fresh or derived, even if being quoted several times. This means the signature size
will not grow with every derivation.
Our Contributions. For the first time, this paper presents a provably secure (correct, anonymous, selec-
tively unforgeable, and strongly context hiding) identity-based quotable ring signature scheme based on
bilinear pairing, under the Subgroup Decision Problem assumption and Computational Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption in the composite order groups. We also present a security model and concrete security analysis
by the reduction to prove the security of the proposed scheme. More precisely, we can show that if there
exists an attacker who can identify the actual signer among a ring of signers, then the Subgroup Decision
Problem is solved, and if there exists an attacker who can selectively forge a valid quotable ring signature,
then the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is solved. We also prove the scheme is strongly context
hiding in a statistical definition.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some related
work that has been studied in the literature. Section 3 introduces some mathematical background used
throughout this paper. In Section 4, we recall some known results about homomorphic encryption and
NIZK, which are used as building blocks in the proposed scheme. In Section 5, we propose a notion of
identity-based quotable ring signature scheme and present a concrete scheme based on bilinear pairing
in the composite order groups. We also present a security model and security proofs about correctness,
anonymity, selectively unforgeability against adaptively chosen message attacks and strongly context hid-
ing property in this section. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
In 1984, Shamir [27] introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography to simplify key manage-
ment procedures in traditional public key setting. In identity-based setting, user’s public key could be easily
and publicly computed from his identity. Digital certificates are not needed.
The concept of ring signature schemes were formalized by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [24, 25]. They
proposed a scheme based on certificate-based public key setting, which is proved existentially unforgeable
under adaptive chosen-message attacks assuming the hardness of the RSA problem. Before the concept
of ring signature scheme is formalized, it is used as a tool to construct group signature schemes in [16,
14]. There are two main differences between the concepts of ring signature schemes and group signature
schemes. First, the ring is determined by the actual signer and is dynamic, while the group members
are controlled by the manager and are fixed at any given time. Second, no one can identify the actual
signer in ring signature schemes, while the group manager can identify the actual signer in group signature
schemes. Bresson, Stern, and Szydlo [10] gave a simpler proof of the security of the scheme in [24],
under the strictly weaker assumption of the random oracle model. Abe, Ohkubo, and Suzuki [1] proposed
some general constructions of ring signature schemes, where the public keys of the users can be totally
independent. Their scheme is also based on the certificate-based public key setting. Herranz and Sáez [20]
gave some security results for generic ring signature schemes, and they designed a new specific scheme
based on Schnorr’s signature scheme.
Shacham and Waters [26] described the first efficient ring signature scheme secure without random
oracles, based on standard assumptions. Their scheme is related to a group signature scheme secure without
2
random oracles due to Boyen and Waters [9]. The main difference is that in [9] the master public key is
public and the first level message is encrypted, while in [26] the signer’s public key is encrypted and the
message is public.
The first identity-based ring signature scheme was proposed by Zhang and Kim [29] based on pairings.
But they did not provide a formal proof of the existential unforgeability of their scheme. Herranz [19]
proposed such a proof of [29]. Later, Lin and Wu [23] proposed a more efficient identity-based ring
signature scheme. Tang, Liu, and Wang [28] pointed out some mistakes in [23] and proposed an improved
scheme. Herranz and Sáez [21] extended their work [20] on ring forking lemmas to the identity-based
scenario.
Ahn et al. [2] proposed an efficient quotable signature scheme, which equipped with strongly context
hiding and selectively unforgeability property. Early work regarding anyone deriving quoted signatures
such as redactable signature schemes [22, 15, 11, 6, 7] supports quoting from a single document, but does
not achieve the privacy or unforgeability properties required in [2]. The work whose definition is closest
to [2] is that on redacted signatures of Chang, Lim, and Xu [15], and Brzuska et al. [11], and Boneh, and
Freeman [6, 7]. However, in [2], a quoted signature should be indistinguishable from a fresh signature, even
when the distinguisher is given the original signature. In contrast, the definitions of [15, 11, 6, 7] do not
provide the distinguisher with the original signature. Thus, it may be possible to link a quoted document to
its original source, which can have negative privacy implications.
Another type of studies computing on authenticated data requires secret information of the original
signer, such as sanitizable signatures [3, 12, 13], and incremental signatures [4], where the signer can
efficiently make small edits to his signed data. In contrast, our work followed [2] concentrate more about
anyone can compute on the authenticated data.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Bilinear Groups of Composite Order
Let n be a composite number with factorization n = pq, where p and q are sufficient large prime
numbers. We have: G is a multiplicative cyclic group of composite order n. Gp is its cyclic order-p
subgroup, and Gq is its cyclic order-q subgroup. g is a generator of G. h is a generator of Gq. GT is a
multiplicative cyclic group of composite order n. GT,p and GT,q are its order-p and order-q subgroups,
respectively.
Let e : G×G→GT be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: e(ua,vb) = e(u,v)ab for all {u,v} ∈G,{a,b} ∈ Zn.
• Non-degeneracy: < e(g,g)>=GT whenever < g >=G.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u,v) for all {u,v} ∈G.
3.2. Subgroup Hiding Assumption
The Subgroup Decision Problem is as follows. Given a composite order n = pq cyclic group G and
its subgroup Gq of order q, w is selected at random either from G (with probability 1/2) or from Gq (with
probability 1/2). Decide whether w is in Gq.
The advantage of an algorithm A solving the Subgroup Decision Problem is defined as A’s excess
probability beyond 1/2 of outputting the correct solution. The Subgroup Decision Problem is said to be
intractable, if for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the success probability of guessing
advantage for the problem is negligible. The assumption that the Subgroup Decision Problem is hard is
called the Subgroup Hiding (SGH) assumption, and was introduced by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [8].
3.3. CDH Problem
Let G be a cyclic group of composite order n. Let g be a generator of G. Let A be an attacker. A tries
to solve the following problem: Given (g,ga,gb) for some unknown a,b ∈ Zn, compute gab.
The CDH problem is said to be intractable, if for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the
success probability is negligible.
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4. NIZK Proof That C Encrypts 0 or 1
We use some cryptographic primitives as building blocks in this scheme. The first one is a homomor-
phic public key encryption scheme, which is proposed by Boneh, Goh and Nissim [8]. The homomorphic
encryption scheme consists of three algorithms, which are as follows.
• KeyGen: Given a security parameter λ , run G(1λ ) to obtain a tuple (p,q,G,GT ,e). Let n = pq,
where p,q are sufficient large prime numbers. Both G,GT are cyclic groups of composite order n.
Select g as a random generator of G and h as a random generator of Gq, which is a cyclic order q
subgroup of G. The public key is (n,G,GT ,e,g,h). The private key is q.
• Encrypt: To encrypt a message m, pick a random s←{0,1, · · · ,n−1} and compute C = gmhs ∈G.
Output C as the ciphertext.
• Decrypt: To decrypt a ciphertext C, compute Cq = gmqhsq = (gq)m. Let ĝ = gq and exhaustively
searth for m.
Note that decryption in this system takes polynomial time in the size of the message space. Therefore,
the system can only be used to encrypt short messages.
The second building block is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof which is proposed by Groth,
Ostrovsky and Sahai [18], which proofs that a BGN-ciphertext has either 0 or 1 as plaintext. The non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof is described as follows.
• Common reference string: Given a security parameter λ , run G(1λ ) to obtain a tuple (p,q,G,GT ,e).
Let n = pq, where p,q are sufficient large prime numbers. Both G,GT are cyclic groups of compos-
ite order n. Select g as a random generator of G and h as a random generator of Gq, which is a cyclic
order q subgroup of G. The common reference string is σ = (n,G,GT ,e,g,h).
• Statement: The statement is an element C ∈G. The claim is that there exists a pair (m,s) ∈ Z2 such
that m ∈ {0,1} and C = gmhs.
• Proof: Input (σ ,C,(m,s)).
– Check m ∈ {0,1} and C = gmhs. Return failure if check fails.
– r← Z∗n;
– π1 = hr,π2 = (g2m−1hs)sr
−1
,π3 = gr;
– Return π = (π1,π2,π3).
• Verification: Input (σ ,C,π = (π1,π2,π3)).
– Check C ∈G and π ∈G3;
– Check e(C,Cg−1) ?= e(π1,π2) and e(π1,g)
?
= e(h,π3);
– Return 1 if both checks pass, else return 0.
In order to make these building blocks suitable for the quotable signature scheme, we should slightly
change the random number s used in the Encrypt algorithm of Boneh, Goh and Nissim encyrption scheme
to s← Z∗n.
The Proof algorithm of Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai NIZK proof scheme should also be slightly changed
as follows.
• Proof: Input (σ ,C,(m,s)).
– Check m ∈ {0,1} and C = gmhs. Return failure if check fails.
– r̂← Z∗n,r = r̂s;
– π1 = hr,π2 = (g2m−1hs)sr
−1
,π3 = gr;
– Return π = (π1,π2,π3).
In fact, as r̂ is a random number, after multiplied to s, r is still a random number. The modified proof
algorithm is essentially the same as the original one. But the elements π1,π2, and π3 have been changed to
π1 = hsr,π2 = (g2m−1hs)r
−1
, and π3 = gsr, respectively.
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5. Identity-Based Quotable Ring Signature
5.1. Definitions
There will be two types of different signatures named Type I signature and Type II signature, where
Type I signature can be quoted down to another Type I or Type II signature, Type II signature cannot be
quoted again but with a shorter signature size. The trusted party Private Key Generator (PKG) generates
all users’ private keys. An identity-based quotable ring signature scheme for message spaceM consists of
the following five algorithms:
Setup: On input of a security parameter λ , PKG selects the master secret key of this scheme and
publishes public parameters params.
Extract: When a party requires its private key corresponding to its identity, this algorithm generates
the private key using the master secret key and the identity, then returns the private key to the party.
Sign: This algorithm takes as input the actual signer’s private key SID and a set of public keys R that
constitutes the ring, along with a message M in the message space to be signed. It is required that QID ∈ R
hold. This algorithm returns a ring signature σ on M on behalf of the ring R.
Quote: This algorithm takes as input a Type I ring signature σ with the corresponding ring R and
message M, and a substring M′ of M. It first checks the validity of σ with respect to R and M. If σ is
valid, it produces a new ring signature σ ′, which is either Type I or Type II, of M′ on behalf of the ring R.
Otherwise, it output a special symbol ⊥ to represent failure.
Verify: The verification algorithm takes as input a set of public keys R that constitutes the ring, and a
purported ring signature σ of a message M on behalf of the ring R. It returns either valid or invalid.
5.2. Security Model
Informally, a ring signature scheme should satisfy two security properties. First, it should be anony-
mous, which means an adversary should not be able to determine which member of a ring generated a
signature. Second, it should be unforgeable, which means an adversary should be able to construct a valid
signature on behalf of a ring only if he knows the secret key corresponding to one of them. Rivest, Shamir,
and Tauman [24] gave a formalization which has been used in much subsequent work. Bender, Katz,
and Morselli [5] described several possible stronger formulations of each notion. In addition to this, as
a quotable signature, it also should be context hiding, which means a derived signature on M′, from an
honestly generated original signature on M, is statistically indistinguishable from a fresh signature on M′,
even if the original signature on M is known. Ahn et al. [2] proposed a strong definition of context hiding
for quotable signature.
For identity-based quotable ring signature scheme, the security model should be slightly modified.
For example, in terms of the unforgeability property, new ring signatures quoted from an valid original
ring signature should not be considered as a forgery even if the adversary did not know the secret key
corresponding to one of the members of the ring.
• Correctness. We require that for all private key SID generated by Extract algorithm and for all
M ∈M, all substring M′ ⊆M, and all ring of public keys R where QID ∈ R we have:
– For both Type I and Type II signatures, Sign(SID,R,M) 6=⊥ and Verify(R,M,Sign(SID,R,M))=
1,
– For all Type I signature σI generated by σI ← Sign(SID,R,M′) or σI ← Quote(σ ′I ,R,M,M′),
Quote(σI ,R,M′,M′′) 6=⊥, and Verify (R,M′′,Quote(σI ,R,M′,M′′)) = 1.
In particular, correctness implies that a signature generated by Quote algorithm can be used as an
input to Quote algorithm so that signatures can be further quoted from quoted signatures.
• Anonymity. We require that any verifier should not have probability greater than 1/d to guess the
identity of the actual signer who has computed a ring signature on behalf of a ring of d members. If
the verifier is a member of the ring distinct from the actual signer, then his probability to guess the
identity of the actual signer should not be greater than 1/(d−1).
Anonymity against full key exposure for an identity-based quotable ring signature scheme is defined
using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A:
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– Setup. The challenger selects ID = {ID1, · · · , IDξ} where ξ is a game parameter. The adver-
sary A is given the public key set ID.
– Queries. Algorithm A is allowed to make ring signing queries and extract queries. A ring
signing query is of the form (i′,R,M). Here M is the message to be signed. R is a set of public
keys, and i′ is an index such that QIDi′ ∈ R holds. (The other keys in R need not be keys in the
set ID). The challenger responds with σ = Sign(SIDi′ ,R,M). An extract query is of the form
IDi. The challenger provides SIDi to A.
– Chanllenge. AlgorithmA requests a challenge by sending to the challenger the values (i0, i1,R,M).
Here M is to be signed with respect to the ring R, and i0 and i1 are indices such that {QIDi0 ,QIDi0 }∈
R. (The other keys in R need not be keys in the set ID.) The challenger chooses a bit b←{0,1},
computes the challenge signature σ ← Sign(SIDib ,R,M), and provides A with σ .
– Output. Algorithm A finally outputs its guess b′ for b, and wins if b = b′.
We define Advanon−keIDQRS,A to be the advantage over 1/2 of A in the above game.
• Unforgeability. We prove our construction selectively secure. Selective security for signatures re-
quires the attacker to give the forgery message before seeing the verification key.
To define unforgeability, we extend the basic notion of existential unforgeability with respect to
adaptive chosen-message attacks [17]. The definition captures the idea that if the attacker is given a
set of signed messages (either primary or quoted), then the only messages he can sign are derivations
of the signed messages he was given.
Unforgeability for an identity-based quotable ring signature scheme IDQRS is defined using the
following game between a challenger and an adversary A.
– Setup. The challenger selects ID = {ID1, · · · , IDξ} where ξ is a game parameter. The adver-
sary A is given the public key set ID.
– Queries. Algorithm A is allowed to make ring signing queries and extract queries. A ring
signing query is of the form (i′,R,M). Here M is the message to be signed. R is a set of public
keys, and i′ is an index such that IDi′ ∈ R holds. (The other keys in R need not be keys in the
set ID). The challenger responds with σ = Sign(SIDi′ ,R,M). An extract query is of the form
IDi. The challenger provides SIDi to A.
– Output. Eventually, A outputs a tuple (R∗,M∗,σ∗) and wins the game if (1) it never made a
ring signing query (i,R,M) such that IDi ∈ R∗ and M equals to or is a superstring of M∗; (2) it
never made an extract query IDi for any IDi ∈ ID, and R∗ ⊆ID; and (3) Verify (R∗,M∗,σ∗) =
valid.
An identity-based quotable ring signature schemes is selectively unforgeable with respect to adap-
tive chosen-message attacks if for all PPT adversaries A, the probability that he wins the game is
negligible in λ .
We define Advsel−u fIDQRS,A to be the probability that A wins in the above game.
• Context Hiding. The notion of anonymity has considered the problem of hiding the identity of a
signer among a set of users. Context hiding ensures privacy for the data rather than the signer.
Our goal is to hide how a ring signature was created. Context hiding captures an important privacy
property, which means a ring signature should reveal nothing more than the message being signed.
In particular, if a ring signature on M′ was quoted from a ring signature on M, an attacker should
not learn anything about M other than what can be inferred from M′. This should be true even if
the original ring signature on M is revealed. For example, a signed quote should not reveal anything
about the message from which it was quoted, including its length, the position of the quote, whether
its parent document is the same as another quote, whether it was derived from a given signed message
or generated freshly, etc.
We can view a message M as a pair (t,m) ∈ {0,1},{0,1}∗. The bit t will identify the message as
being Type I or Type II (assume t = 1 signifies Type I signatures) and m will be the message to be
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signed. We note that this description allows an attacker to distinguish between any Type I signature
from any Type II signature since the “type bit” of the messages will be different and thus they will
technically be two different messages even if the message components are equal. For this reason we
will only need to prove context hiding between messages of Type I or Type II, but not across types.
In general, flipping the bit t will not result in a valid signature of a different type on the same core
message, because the format will be wrong. However, moving from a Type I to a Type II on the same
core message is not considered a forgery since Type II signatures can be legally derived from Type I.
We put forth the following powerful statistical definition of context hiding.
Let M ∈ M and M′ ⊆ M be a substring of M. Let SIDi ← Extract(IDi), R be a ring such that
QIDi ∈ R. An identity-based quotable ring signature scheme is strongly context hiding if for all such
triples (SIDi ,M,M
′), the following two distribution are statistically close:
{
(
SIDi ,σM ← Sign(SIDi ,R,M),Sign(SIDi ,R,M
′)
)
}SIDi ,M,M′
{
(
SIDi ,σM ← Sign(SIDi ,R,M),Quote(σM,R,M,M
′)
)
}SIDi ,M,M′
The definition states that a derived signature on M′, from an honestly generated original ring signa-
ture, is statistically indistinguishable from a fresh ring signature on M′. This implies that a derived
ring signature on M′ is indistinguishable from a ring signature generated independently of M. There-
fore, the derived ring signature cannot (provably) reveal any information about M beyond what is
revealed by M′.
Using statistical indistinguishability meaning that even an unbounded adversary cannot distinguish
derived ring signatures from newly created ones. The same holds even if the signing key is leaked.
5.3. Proposed Scheme
The design of this scheme follows the idea of the Ahn et al. quotable signature scheme [2], which is
not identity-based and not ring signature.
Setup (1λ ): On input of the security parameter 1λ , construct a group G of composite order n = pq as
described in Sect.3.1. Let L be the maximum message length supported and denote n′ = blg(L)c. Let
Ha : {0,1}∗ → G∗,Hb : {0,1}∗ → G∗ and H : {0,1}∗ → G∗ be three hash functions. Choose random
w,z0, · · · ,zn′−1,α ← Z∗n. Set W = gw,U = hα ,Ppub = gα . The master secret key is MK = (α). The public
parameter is params =
(
Ha,Hb,H,g,h,n,gz0 , · · · ,gzn′−1 ,W,U,Ppub
)
.
Extract (MK, ID): On input of the master secret key MK and a user’s identity ID, compute QID = H(ID),
the user’s secret key is SID = QαID.
Sign (SID,R,M = (t,m) ∈ {0,1}×
∑l≤L): We sketch how this algorithm works for a message of length
l. Firstly, visualize a matrix with (l + 1) columns and (blglc+ 2) rows. The columns correspond to the
characters of the message, with a character in between each column. The rows correspond to the numbers
lgl down to 0, plus an extra row at the bottom. Each location (ic, ir) in the matrix (except along the bottom-
most row) contains one or more out-going arrows. A “start” arrow goes down one row and over 2ir columns
ending in (ic +2ir , ir−1), if this end point is in the matrix. This type of arrow indicates that a quote starts
here. A “one” arrow operates similarly to start arrows and is used to include characters after a start arrow
includes the quote prefix. A “zero” arrow goes straight down one row ending in (ic, ir−1). This does not
add any characters to the quoted substring. We refer the reader to [2] for more details about this.
This algorithm takes as input a signer’s private key SID, a ring R of public keys, and a message M.
No public key may appear twice in R, and R must include QID. If t = 1, ring signatures produced by this
algorithm are Type I as described below. If t = 0, the Type II signature can be obtained by running this
algorithm and then running the Quote-Type II algorithm below to obtain a quote on the entire message. The
message space is treated as l ≤ L symbols from alphabet
∑
. We use notation mi, j to denote the substring
of m of length j starting at position i.
Let d = |R|, parse the elements of R as QIDk ∈G,1≤ k≤ d. Let k∗ be the index such that QIDk∗ = QID.
Define { fk}dk=1 as fk =
{
1 if k = k∗,
0 otherwise.
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For i = 3 to l + 1 and j = 0 to blg(i− 1)− 1c, choose random values xi, j ∈ Zn. Set xi,−1 := 0 for all
i = 1 to l +1.
• Choose random number u from Z∗n and set Ū = hu,Û = h1/u,Ũ = gu.
• For each k,1≤ k ≤ d, choose random exponents sk from Z∗n and set
Vk = (QIDk/W )
fk hsk
πk1 = hsku,πk2 =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1hsk
)1/u
,πk3 = gsku,πk4 = gsk
• Let s =
∑d
k=1 sk and set G = P
s
pub = g
αs.
• For i = 1 to l and j = 0 to blg(l− i+1)c, for randomly chosen values ri, j ∈ Zn:
Bi, j = Hb(mi,2 j)
ri, j g−xi+2 j , j−1SID ·U s, B̃i, j = gri, j
• For i = 3 to l and j = 0 to min(blg(i−1)−1c,blg(l− i+1)c), for randomly chosen values r′i, j ∈ Zn:
Ai, j = Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1 , Ãi, j = g
r′i, j
• For i = 3 to l +1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c, for randomly chosen values r′′i, j ∈ Zn:
Di, j = gxi, j g−xi, j−1g
z j ·r′′i, j , D̃i, j = g
r′′i, j
The ring signature is σ =
(
Ū ,Û ,Ũ ,{Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1,G,Bi, j, B̃i, j,Ai, j, Ãi, j,Di, j, D̃i, j
)
.
The values πk1,πk2,πk3 and πk4 act as a proof that Vk is well-formed, which means that fk ∈ {0,1}.
Observe that, when there is exactly one non-zero value amongst { fk}, say fk∗ , we have W ·
∏d
k=1 Vk =
QID∗hs, so
∏d
k=1 Vk serves as an encryption of the user’s public key.
Quote (σ ,R,M = (t,m),M′ = (t ′,m′)): To derive a new ring signature on a substring M′ of M, one
roughly removes the group elements not associated with the new substring and then re-randomizes the
remaining part of the ring signature. In addition, there is a second option in our quote algorithm that allows
for the derivation of a short ring signature. However the quote procedure cannot be applied again to this
short ring signature. Thus, we support quoting from quotes, and also provide a compression option which
produces a very short quote, but the price for this is that it cannot be quoted from further.
First, check the validity of σ with respect to R and M. If it is not valid, output ⊥. If M′ is not a
substring of M, output ⊥. Otherwise, if t ′ = 1, output Quote-Type I (σ ,R,m,m′); if t ′ = 0, output Quote-
Type II (σ ,R,m,m′).
Quote-Type I (σ ,R,m,m′): This quote algorithm takes a Type I signature and produces another Type I
signature that maintains the ability to be quoted again.
If m′ is not a substring of m, then output⊥. Otherwise, let l′= |m′|. Determine the first index δ at which
substring m′ occurs in m. Parse σ as a collection of Ū ,Û ,Ũ ,{Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1,G,Bi, j, B̃i, j,Ai, j, Ãi, j,
Di, j, D̃i, j values.
Choose re-randomization values to re-randomize the xi, j terms of σ . For i = 2 to l′+ 1 and j = 0 to
blg(i−1)−1c, choose random values yi, j ∈ Zn. Set yi,−1 := 0 for all i = 1 to l′+1.
• Choose random number u′ from Z∗n and set Ū ′ = Ūu
′
= huu
′
,Û ′ = Û (1/u
′) = h(1/uu
′),Ũ ′ = Ũu
′
= guu
′
.
• For each k,1≤ k ≤ d, choose random exponents s′k from Z∗n and set
V ′k =Vk ·hs
′
k = (QIDk/W )
fk h(sk+s
′
k)
π ′k1 = (πk1 ·Ū
s′k)u
′
π ′k2 = (πk2 ·Û
s′k)(1/u
′) π ′k3 = (πk3 ·Ũ
s′k)u
′
π ′k4 = πk4 ·g
s′k
= (h(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
, =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1h(sk+s
′
k)
)(1/uu′)
, = (g(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
, = g(sk+s
′
k)
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• Let s′ =
∑d
k=1 s
′
k and set G
′ = G ·Ps′pub = gα(s+s
′).
• For i = 1 to l′ and j = 0 to blg(l′− i+1)c, for randomly chosen ti, j ∈ Zn:
B′i, j = Bi+δ−1, j ·Hb(mi+δ−1,2 j)ti, j ·g
−yi+2 j , j−1 ·U
∑d
k=1 s
′
k , B̃′i, j = ˜Bi+δ−1, j ·g
ti, j
• For i= 3 to l′ and j = 0 to min(blg(i−1)−1c,blg(l′− i+1)c), for randomly chosen values t ′i, j ∈Zn:
A′i, j = Ai+δ−1, j ·Ha(mi+δ−1,2 j)
t ′i, j ·gyi, j ·g−yi+2 j , j−1 , Ã′i, j = ˜Ai+δ−1, j ·g
t ′i, j
• For i = 3 to l′+1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c, for randomly chosen values t ′′i, j ∈ Zn:
D′i, j = Di+δ−1, j ·gyi, j ·g−yi, j−1 ·g
z j ·t ′′i, j , D̃′i, j = D̃i+δ−1, j ·g
t ′′i, j
The ring signature is σ ′ =
(
Ū ′,Û ′,Ũ ′,{V ′k ,π ′k1,π ′k2,π ′k3,π ′k4}dk=1,G′,B′i, j, B̃′i, j,A′i, j, Ã′i, j,D′i, j, D̃′i, j
)
.
Quote-Type II (σ ,R,m,m′): This quote algorithm takes a Type I signature and produces a Type II
signature. A Type II quote will trace a (lgl′+ 1)-length path on those arrows through the matrix of the
original Type I signature, where l′ is the length of the quote. It always starts with a start arrow and then
contains one and zero arrows according to the binary representation of the length of the quote. Intuitively,
taking an arrow over a character includes it in the quote.
Consider the length l′ written as a binary string. Let β be the largest index of l′ = |m′| that is set to
1, where we start counting with zero as the least significant bit. That is, set β = blg(l′)c. Select random
values v,vβ−1, · · · ,v0 ∈ Zn.
Choose random number u′ from Z∗n and set Ũ ′ = Ũu
′
= guu
′
.
For each k,1≤ k ≤ d, choose random exponents s′k from Z∗n and set
V ′k =Vk ·hs
′
k = (QIDk/W )
fk h(sk+s
′
k)
π ′k1 = (πk1 ·Ū
s′k)u
′
π ′k2 = (πk2 ·Û
s′k)(1/u
′) π ′k3 = (πk3 ·Ũ
s′k)u
′
π ′k4 = πk4 ·g
s′k
= (h(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
, =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1h(sk+s
′
k)
)(1/uu′)
, = (g(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
, = g(sk+s
′
k)
Let s′ =
∑d
k=1 s
′
k and set G
′ = G ·Ps′pub = gα(s+s
′).
Set the start position as K′ = Bδ ,β ·U
∑d
k=1 s
′
k and δ ′ = δ +2β . Then, from j = β −1 down to 0, proceed
as follows:
• If the jth bit of l′ is 1, set K′ = K′ ·Aδ ′, j ·Ha(mδ ′,2 j)v j , and Z′j = Ãδ ′, j ·gv j , set δ ′ = δ ′+2 j;
• If the jth bit of l′ is 0, set K′ = K′ ·Dδ ′, j ·gz j ·v j and Z′j = D̃δ ′, j ·gv j .
To end, re-randomize as K′ = K′ ·Hb(mδ ,2β )v and B̃′ = B̃δ ,β ·gv.
Output the quote as σ ′ =
(
Ũ ′,{V ′k ,π ′k1,π ′k2,π ′k3,π ′k4}dk=1,G′,K′, B̃′,Z′β−1, · · · ,Z
′
0
)
.
Verify (R,M = (t,m),σ ): Let d = |R|, parse the elements of R as QIDk ∈ G,1 ≤ k ≤ d. Verify that no
element is repeated in R and reject otherwise.
Parse Type I signature as σ =
(
Ū ,Û ,Ũ ,{Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1,G,Bi, j, B̃i, j,Ai, j, Ãi, j,Di, j, D̃i, j,
)
. Parse
Type II signature as σ =
(
Ũ ,{Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1,G,K, B̃,Zβ−1, · · · ,Z0,
)
.
Check first that the proofs {Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1 are valid.
First check {Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1 ∈G5d . Then, for each k,1≤ k ≤ d, check whether
e(Vk,Vk/(QIDk/W ))
?
= e(πk1,πk2),e(πk1,g)
?
= e(h,πk3) and e(πk4,Ũ)
?
= e(g,πk3) hold.
If any of the proofs is invalid, reject.
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Otherwise, set V =
∏d
k=1 Vk. Then, check whether e(
∏d
k=1 πk4,Ppub)
?
= e(G,g) holds. If it is invalid,
reject.
If t = 1, output Verify-Type I(R,m,σ ). Otherwise, output Verify-Type II(R,m,σ ).
Verify-Type I (R,m,σ ): Let l = |m|. Let Xi, j denote e(g,g)xi, j .
The value Xi,−1 = 1, since for all i = 1 to l +1, xi,−1 = 0.
For i = 3 to l +1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c, let I = i−2 j+1 and J = j+1. Compute
Xi, j =
(
e
(
Hb(mI,2J ), B̃I,J
)
· e
(
WV,Ppub
))
/e(BI,J ,g)
The verification accepts if and only if all of the following hold:
• For i = 3 to l and j = 0 to min(blg(i−1)−1c,blg(l− i+1)c),
e(Ai, j,g) = Xi, j/Xi+2 j , j−1 · e
(
Ha(mi,2 j), Ãi, j
)
(1)
• For i = 3 to l +1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c,
e(Di, j,g) = Xi, j/Xi, j−1 · e
(
gz j , D̃i, j
)
(2)
Verify-Type II (R,m,σ ): Let l = |m| and β be the index of the highest bit of l that is set to 1.
Set N = 1 and δ = 1+2β . From j = β −1 down to 0, proceed as follows:
• If the jth bit of l is 1, set N = N · e
(
Ha
(
mδ ,2 j
)
,Z j
)
and δ = δ +2 j;
• If the jth bit of l is 0, set N = N · e(gz j ,Z j).
Accept if and only if
e(K,g) = e
(
Hb
(
m1,2β
)
, B̃
)
· e
(
WV,Ppub
)
·N (3)
5.4. Security Analysis
Theorem 1. This identity-based quotable ring signature scheme is correct.
PROOF. For the Type I signature.
Parse σ as the set of Ū ,Û ,Ũ ,{Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1,G,Bi, j, B̃i, j,Ai, j, Ãi, j,Di, j, D̃i, j. Let l = |m|.
For fk = 1,
e
(
Vk,Vk/(QIDk/W )
) ?
= e(πk1,πk2)
e
(
(QIDk/W )h
sk ,hsk
) ?
= e
(
hsku,
(
(QIDk/W )h
sk
)1/u)
e
(
(QIDk/W )h
sk ,hsk
)
= e
(
hsk ,(QIDk/W )h
sk
)
For fk = 0,
e
(
Vk,Vk/(QIDk/W )
) ?
= e(πk1,πk2)
e
(
hsk ,hsk/(QIDk/W )
) ?
= e
(
hsku,
(
(QIDk/W )
−1hsk
)1/u)
e
(
hsk ,hsk(QIDk/W )
−1) = e(hsk ,(QIDk/W )−1hsk)
e(πk1,g)
?
= e(h,πk3) e(πk4,Ũ)
?
= e(g,πk3) e(
∏d
k=1 πk4,Ppub)
?
= e(G,g)
e(hsku,g) = e(h,gsku) e(gsk ,gu) = e(g,gsku) e(gs,gα) = e(gαs,g)
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For i = 3 to l +1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c,
Xi, j =
(
e
(
Hb(mI,2J ), B̃I,J
)
· e
(
WV,Ppub
))
/e(BI,J ,g)
=
(
e
(
Hb(mi−2 j+1,2 j+1), ˜Bi−2 j+1, j+1
)
· e(QID ·hs,gα)
)
/e
(
Bi−2 j+1, j+1,g
)
=
(
e
(
Hb(mi−2 j+1,2 j+1),g
ri−2 j+1 , j+1
)
· e(QID ·hs,gα)
)
/e
(
Hb
(
mi−2 j+1,2 j+1
)ri−2 j+1 , j+1 g−xi−2 j+1+2 j+1 , j+1−1SID ·U s,g)
=
(
e
(
Hb(mi−2 j+1,2 j+1),g
ri−2 j+1 , j+1
)
· e(QID ·hs,gα)
)
/e
(
Hb
(
mi−2 j+1,2 j+1
)ri−2 j+1 , j+1 g−xi, j QαID ·hαs,g)
= 1/e
(
g−xi, j ,g
)
= e(g,g)xi, j
For i = 3 to l and j = 0 to min(blg(i−1)−1c,blg(l− i+1)c),
e(Ai, j,g) = Xi, j/Xi+2 j , j−1 · e
(
Ha(mi,2 j), Ãi, j
)
e
(
Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1 ,g
)
= e(g,g)xi, j /e(g,g)xi+2 j , j−1 · e
(
Ha(mi,2 j),g
r′i, j
)
Both sides of equation (1) are equal.
For i = 3 to l +1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c,
e(Di, j,g) = Xi, j/Xi, j−1 · e
(
gz j , D̃i, j
)
e
(
gxi, j g−xi, j−1gz j ·r
′′
i, j ,g
)
= e(g,g)xi, j /e(g,g)xi, j−1 · e
(
gz j ,gr
′′
i, j
)
Both sides of equation (2) are equal.
For the Type II signature.
Parse σ ′ as the set of Ũ ′,{V ′k ,π ′k1,π ′k2,π ′k3,π ′k4}dk=1,G′,K′, B̃′,Z′β−1, · · · ,Z
′
0.
K′ = Hb
(
m
δ ,2β
)(rδ ,β+v)
SID ·U (s+s
′) ·
∏
j<β ,l′j=1
Ha(m′j)
(r′
δ+ŝ j−1, j
+v j) ·
∏
j′<β ,l′
j′=0
g
z j′ (r
′′
δ+ŝ j′ −1, j
′+v j′ )
B̃′ = g(rδ ,β+v),(Z′j) j<β ,l′j=1 = g
(r′
δ+ŝ j−1, j
+v j)
,(Z′j′) j′<β ,l′j′=0
= g
(r′′
δ+ŝ j′ −1, j
′+v j′ )
N′ =
∏
j<β ,l′j=1
e
(
Ha(m′j),Z
′
j
)
·
∏
j′<β ,l′
j′=0
e
(
gz j ,Z′j′
)
For fk = 1,
e
(
V ′k ,V
′
k/(QIDk/W )
) ?
= e(π ′k1,π
′
k2)
e
(
(QIDk/W )h
(sk+s′k),h(sk+s
′
k)
)
?
= e
(
(h(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
,
(
(QIDk/W )h
(sk+s′k)
)(1/uu′))
e
(
(QIDk/W )h
(sk+s′k),h(sk+s
′
k)
)
= e
(
h(sk+s
′
k),(QIDk/W )h
(sk+s′k)
)
For fk = 0,
e
(
V ′k ,V
′
k/(QIDk/W )
) ?
= e(π ′k1,π
′
k2)
e
(
h(sk+s
′
k),h(sk+s
′
k)/(QIDk/W )
)
?
= e
(
(h(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
,
(
(QIDk/W )
−1h(sk+s
′
k)
)(1/uu′))
e
(
h(sk+s
′
k),h(sk+s
′
k)(QIDk/W )
−1
)
= e
(
h(sk+s
′
k),(QIDk/W )
−1h(sk+s
′
k)
)
e(π ′k1,g)
?
= e(h,π ′k3)
e
(
(h(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
,g
)
= e
(
h,(g(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
)
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e(π ′k4,Ũ ′)
?
= e(g,π ′k3)
e
(
g(sk+s
′
k),guu
′
)
= e
(
g,(g(sk+s
′
k))uu
′
)
e(
d∏
k=1
π
′
k4,Ppub)
?
= e(G′,g)
e(g(s+s
′),gα) = e(gα(s+s
′),g)
The left side of equation (3)
e(K′,g)
= e
(
Hb
(
m
δ ,2β
)(rδ ,β+v)
SID ·U (s+s
′) ·
∏
j<β ,l′j=1
Ha(m′j)
(r′
δ+ŝ j−1, j
+v j) ·
∏
j′<β ,l′
j′=0
g
z j′ (r
′′
δ+ŝ j′ −1, j
′+v j′ )
,g
)
The right side of equation (3)
e
(
Hb
(
m′
1,2β
)
, B̃
)
· e
(
WV ′,Ppub
)
·N′
= e
(
Hb
(
m
δ ,2β
)
,g(rδ ,β+v)
)
· e
(
QID ·h(s+s
′),gα
)
·
∏
j<β ,l′j=1
e
(
Ha(m′j),Z
′
j
)
·
∏
j′<β ,l′
j′=0
e
(
gz j ,Z′j′
)
Both sides of equation (3) are equal.
Theorem 2. This identity-based quotable ring signature scheme is anonymous against full key exposure
under the assumption that the subgroup decision problem is hard.
PROOF. The anonymity proof closely follows that given by Shacham and Waters for their ring signature
scheme [26].
The proof proceeds in games. We define Game 0 as follows. Algorithm B is given the group order n
(but not its factorization), the description of the group G, together with generators g of G and h which is
uniformly chosen from Gq. B follows the Setup algorithm to obtain system parameters (w,z0, · · · ,zn′−1,α)
and (W,U,Ppub). B also chooses three hash functions Ha,Hb,H and selects ID = {ID1, · · · , IDξ}.
B runs A, providing to it the description of the group G, including its order n and the generators g and
h. B also provides toA system parameters (w,z0, · · · ,zn′−1,α) and (W,U,Ppub), along with the description
of the hash functions Ha,Hb,H, and the challenge public keys {QIDi}
ξ
i=1. When A makes a ring signing
query of the form ( j,R,M), B responds with σ = Sign(SID j ,R,M). Finally, A requests a challenge with
the values ( j0, j1,R,M). Algorithm B chooses a bit b← {0,1}, computes the challenge ring signature
σ = Sign(SID jb ,R,M), and provides A with σ . In addition, the challenger provides A with the Extract
oracle, which can be queried for any identity. Actually, as the secret key is also given to the adversary A,
ring signing queries and Extract queries could be answered by himself. Algorithm A finally outputs its
guess b′ for b. B outputs 1 if b = b′, 0 otherwise.
Game 1 is identical to Game 0, except for the h is uniformly chosen from G.
Denote by Advgame−0B the advantage B has over 1/2 in Game 0, and by Adv
game−1
B the advantage over
1/2 it has in Game 1. We have Advgame−0B = Adv
anon−ke
IDQRS,A, since in Game 0 A’s environment is exactly as
specified in the anonymity game. Moreover, suppose that B’s output were different in the two games. Then
we could use B, with A as a subroutine, to solve the subgroup decision problem: given generators (g,h) to
test, we provide them to B and output 1 if B does. This gives a new algorithm C for which we have
Advsd pC =
∣∣∣Pr[B = 1|h R←Gq]−Pr[B = 1|h R←G]∣∣∣
1
2
∣∣∣(2Pr[B = 1,h R←Gq]−1)− (2Pr[B = 1|h R←G]−1)∣∣∣
1
2
∣∣∣(Advgame−0B −Advgame−1B ∣∣∣
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We argue that Advgame−1B = 0, even if A is computationally unbounded. Consider the distinguishing
challenge
(
Ū ,Û ,Ũ ,{(Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4)}dk=1,G,Bi, j, B̃i, j,Ai, j, Ãi, j,Di, j, D̃i, j,
)
. For each k, we have Vk =
(QIDk/W )
fk hsk with fk ∈ {0,1} and sk ∈ Z∗n. But when h is a generator of G there exist τk0,τk1 ∈ Zn and
γ ∈Z∗n such that Vk = (QIDk/W )hτk1 = hτk0 and g= hγ . Moreover, denoting by (πk| fk = b) the values which
πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4 are assigned if fk is set to b ∈ {0,1}, we have
(πk| fk = 1)
=
(
πk1 = (hτk1)u,πk2 = ((QIDk/W )h
τk1)1/u,πk3 = (gτk1)u = (hτk1)uγ ,πk4 = gτk1 = (hτk1)γ
)
=
(
πk1 = (hτk0/(QIDk/W ))
u,πk2 = (hτk0)1/u,πk3 = (hτk0/(QIDk/W ))
uγ ,πk4 = (hτk0/(QIDk/W ))
γ
)
= (πk| fk = 0)
so for each k the tuple (Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4) is consistent with either fk = 0 or fk = 1, and A can gain
no information from this part of the signature. The values Ū ,Û ,Ũ ,G, B̃i, j,Ai, j, Ãi, j,Di, j, D̃i, j are unre-
lated to the choice of signer. Thus if A can gain information, it is only from Bi, j. But, having fixed
(Ū ,Û ,Ũ ,{(Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4)}dk=1,G, B̃i, j,Ai, j, Ãi, j,Di, j, D̃i, j), Bi, j are fixed values to satisfy the verifica-
tion equations. Specifically, letting Ppub = gα , B̃i, j = gri, j , and WV = gc which serves as an encryption of
the user’s public key, we have Bi, j = Hb(mi,2 j)
ri, j g−xi+2 j , j−1 · gαc. Thus these values give no information
about whether SID j0 or SID j1 was used to generate the challenge signature, andA can do no better than guess
b. This establishes Advgame−1B = 0. We see that Adv
anon−ke
IDQRS,A ≤ 2Adv
sd p
C . If Adv
anon−ke
IDQRS,A is non-negligible,
then so is Advsd pC .
Theorem 3. If the CDH assumption holds in G, then this identity-based quotable ring signature scheme is
selectively unforgeable in the random oracle model.
PROOF. The algorithm that makes the reduction is given the factorization of n. This allows it to undo BGN
blinding with hs terms, and to recover from a signature the values fk used in generating it.
Suppose an adversary A can produce a forgery, then we can construct an adversary B that breaks the
CDH assumption.
On input the CDH challenge (g,ga,gb), B begins to run A and proceeds as follows:
A first announces the message M∗ on which he will forge.
Let L be the maximum size of any message and let n′ = blg(L)c. Let M∗ = (t∗,m∗) and l∗ = |m∗| and
let β be the highest bit of l∗ set to 1 (numbering the least significant bit as zero). Let g be the generator
of G. Algorithm B is given g1,g2 ∈ G. Here, g1 = ga,g2 = gb, and (g,g1,g2) is a random instance of the
CDH problem. Its goal is to compute gab.
Algorithm B starts by setting Ppub = g1 = ga,h = gp,U = (ga)p = ha. B randomly selects w ∈ Z∗n and
set W = gw. For i = 0 to n′− 1, choose a random vi ∈ Z∗n and set gzi =
{
gbvi if the ith bit of l∗ is 1;
gvi otherwise.
Algorithm B selects ID = {ID1, · · · , IDξ}. Algorithm B sends (g,h,n,gz0 , · · · ,gzn′−1 ,W,U,Ppub,ID) to
the algorithm A. Algorithm B will simulate the oracles and interact with the forger A as described below.
• H queries: In the simulation, Bmaintains a list H-List of tuples (IDi,H(IDi),µi) as explained below.
This list is initially empty.
If the query IDi already appears on the H-List in a tuple (IDi,H(IDi),µi), then algorithm B responds
with H(IDi). Otherwise, for the ith new query IDi, the following conditions are satisfied:
– if IDi /∈ ID,B chooses µi ∈R Z∗n and sets H(IDi) = gµi . Then B adds (IDi,H(IDi),µi) to the
H-List;
– otherwise IDi ∈ ID,B chooses µi ∈R Z∗n and sets H(IDi) = g
µi
2 = g
bµi where g2 is in the
instance of the CDH problem. Then B adds (IDi,H(IDi),µi) to the H-List.
In either case, H(IDi) is returned to A as the answer.
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• Hb queries: If the query has been made before, return the same response as before.
Imagine dividing up m∗ into a sequence of segments whose lengths are decreasing powers of two;
that is, the first segment would be of length 2β where β is the largest power of two less than l∗, the
second segment would contain the next largest power of two, etc. Let m∗( j) denote the segment of m
∗
corresponding to power j. If no such segment exists, let m∗( j) =⊥.
Select a random η ∈ Z∗n and return the response as:
Hb(x) =
{
gη if |x|= 2β and m∗(β ) = x;
gbη otherwise.
Note that Hb(m∗( j)) is set according to the first method only for the first segment of m
∗.
• Ha queries: If the query has been made before, return the same response as before. Otherwise, select
a random θ ∈ Z∗n and return the response as:
Ha(x)=
{
gθ if |x|= 2 j and j < β and m∗( j) = x (x is on the selective path);
gbθ otherwise (x is not on the selective path).
Note that Ha(m∗( j)) is set according to the first method for all segments of m
∗ except the first segment
m∗(β ).
• Extract queries: If the query has been made before, return the same response as before. Otherwise,
algorithm B checks H-List. If there is no tuple on the H-List containing IDi, B will issue this query
by itself to ensure that there is a tuple (IDi,H(IDi),µi) on the H-List. B creates and keeps one list
Ex-List to simulate Extract oracle. At the beginning of the simulaiton, this list is empty.
For each Extract query with respect to a user IDi except for those in the set ID, using the µi value in
the record on H-List corresponding to IDi, B computes and returns SIDi =P
µi
pub = g
aµi =(gµi)a =QaIDi
as the user IDi’s private key. Then, B records the tuple (IDi,SIDi) in the Ex-List.
• Sign queries: For every query (i′,R,M), check whether IDi′ ∈ R. If IDi′ is not in the ring R, output
⊥ to indicate the query is invalid. Otherwise, choose random number u from Z∗n and set Ū = hu,Û =
h1/u,Ũ = gu.
Let d = |R|, parse the elements of R as QIDk ∈G,1≤ k≤ d. Define { fk}dk=1 as fk =
{
1 if k = i′,
0 otherwise.
For each k,1≤ k ≤ d, choose random exponents sk from Z∗n and set
Vk = (QIDk/W )
fk hsk
πk1 = hsku,πk2 =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1hsk
)1/u
,πk3 = gsku,πk4 = gsk
Let s =
∑d
k=1 sk. Set G = P
s
pub = g
αs.
Let M = (t,m) and l = |m|. Recall that β ∗ is the highest bit of l∗ set to 1 and that we are counting up
from zero as the least significant bit.
We describe how to create signatures. If IDi′ /∈ ID, SIDi′ could be derived by querying the Extract
oracle. Then the challenger could use SIDi′ to generate signatures via the normal Sign algorithm.
Otherwise, the challenger could simulate signatures as follows.
1. When t = 1 and m∗ is not a substring of m (Type I Signature Generation):
Here mi, j denotes the substring m of length j starting at position i. It will help us to first establish
the variables Xi, j, which will be set to 1 if on the selective forgery path and 0 otherwise. We
give a set of “rules” defining terms and make a few observations. Then we describe how the
reduction algorithm creates the signatures.
Rules.
For i = 1 up to l +1,
For j = blg(l− i+1)c down to −1,
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(a) If j+1 = β ∗ and mi−2 j+1,2 j+1 = m
∗
( j+1), then set Xi, j = 1.
(b) Else, if j+1 < β ∗ and ( j+1)th bit of l∗ is 1 and mi−2 j+1,2 j+1 =m
∗
( j+1) and Xi−2 j+1, j+1 = 1,
then set Xi, j = 1.
(c) Else if j+1 < β ∗ and ( j+1)th bit of l∗ is 0 and Xi, j+1 = 1, then set Xi, j = 1.
(d) Else set Xi, j = 0.
Observations. Before we show how B will simulate the signatures, we make a set of useful
observations.
(a) For all i and j ≥ β ∗, Xi, j = 0.
(b) For all i,Xi,−1 = 0. Otherwise, mi−l∗,l∗ = m∗.
(c) For all i, j, if Xi, j = 1 and Xi, j−1 = 0, then the jth bit of l∗ is 1. If the jth bit were 0, then
Xi, j−1 would have been set to 1 by Rule 1c.
(d) For all i, j, if Xi, j = 0 and Xi, j−1 = 1, then the jth bit of l∗ is 1. If the jth bit were 0, then
the only way to set Xi, j−1 to 1 would be by Rule 1c, however, Xi, j = 0 so Rule 1c does not
apply.
(e) For all i, j, if Xi, j = 1 and Xi+2 j , j−1 = 0, then Ha(mi,2 j) = g
bθ for some known θ ∈ Z∗n.
Otherwise, Xi+2 j , j−1 would have been set by Rule 1b to be 1.
(f) For all i, j, if Xi, j = 0 and Xi+2 j , j−1 = 1, then Ha(mi,2 j) = g
bθ for some known θ ∈ Z∗n. If
Xi+2 j , j−1 = 1 and Xi, j = 0, then Xi−2 j , j−1 was set to be 1 either by Rule 1a or Rule 1c. If it
were Rule 1a, then j = β ∗ and it follows from the programming of the random oracle that
Ha(mi,2 j) = g
bθ . If it were Rule 1c, then the jth bit of l∗ is 0, meaning m( j) cannot be on
the selective path and therefore again Ha(mi,2 j) = g
bθ .
(g) For all i, j, if Xi+2 j , j−1 = 0, then Hb(mi,2 j) = g
bη for some known η ∈ Z∗n. If j 6= β ∗, this
follows immediately from the programming of the random oracle. Otherwise, if j = β ∗,
then the only way for Xi+2 j , j−1 = 0 would be if m(β ) 6= m∗(β ) by Rule 1a. Thus, it also
follows that Hb(mi,2 j) = g
bη .
Signature Components. Next, for i = 1 to l + 1 and j = 0 to blg(l− i+ 1)c, choose a ran-
dom x′i, j ∈ Zn and logically set xi, j = x′i, j +Xi, j · (abµi′), where µi′ has been used in the H-list
corresponding to IDi′ . For i = 1 to l +1, set xi,−1 = 0 (as consistent with Observation 1b).
A signature is comprised of the following values:
– Start. For i = 1 to l and j = 0 to blg(l− i+1)c:
(a) If Xi+2 j , j−1 = 0, then it follows by Observation 1g that Hb(mi,2 j) = g
bη for some
known η ∈ Z∗n, so choose random ŝi, j ∈ Zn, implicitly set ri, j =−aµi′/η + ŝi, j and set
Bi, j = g
−x′
i+2 j , j−1gbη ŝi, jU s
= g−xi+2 j , j−1gbη(ri, j+aµi′/η)has
= (gbη)ri, j g−xi+2 j , j−1(gbµi′ )ahas
= Hb(mi,2 j)
ri, j g−xi+2 j , j−1SIDi′h
as
B̃i, j = g−aµi′/η+ŝi, j = gri, j
(b) Else Xi+2 j , j−1 = 1, so choose random ri, j ∈ Zn and with xi+2 j , j−1 = x′i+2 j , j−1 +abµi′
set
Bi, j = Hb(mi,2 j)
ri, j g
−x′
i+2 j , j−1U s
= Hb(mi,2 j)
ri, j g−xi+2 j , j−1(gbµi′ )ahas
= Hb(mi,2 j)
ri, j g−xi+2 j , j−1SIDi′h
as
B̃i, j = gri, j
– Across. Together with the following values for i = 3 to l and j = 0 to min(blg(i− 1)−
1c,blg(l− i+1)c):
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(a) If Xi, j = 1 and Xi+2 j , j−1 = 1, choose random r
′
i, j ∈ Zn with implicitly set xi, j = x′i, j +
abµi′ and xi+2 j , j−1 = x
′
i+2 j , j−1 +abµi′ and set
Ai, j = Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gx
′
i, j g
−x′
i+2 j , j−1
= Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1
Ãi, j = g
r′i, j
(b) Else, if Xi, j = 1 and Xi+2 j , j−1 = 0, then Ha(mi,2 j)= g
bθ for some known θ ∈Z∗n by Ob-
servation 1e. Choose random ŝ′i, j ∈Zn with implicitly set xi, j = x′i, j+abµi′ ,xi+2 j , j−1 =
x′i+2 j , j−1 and r
′
i, j =−aµi′/θ + ŝ′i, j and set
Ai, j = g
x′i, j g
−x′
i+2 j , j−1gbθ ŝ
′
i, j
= g(xi, j−abµi′ )g−xi+2 j , j−1gbθ(r
′
i, j+aµi′/θ)
= (gbθ )r
′
i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1
= Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1
Ã′i, j = g
−aµi′/θ+ŝ′i, j = gr
′
i, j
(c) Else, if Xi, j = 0 and Xi+2 j , j−1 = 1, then Ha(mi,2 j) = g
bθ for some known θ ∈ Z∗n by
Observation 1f. Choose random ŝ′i, j ∈ Zn with implicitly set xi, j = x′i, j,xi+2 j , j−1 =
x′i+2 j , j−1 +abµi′ and r
′
i, j = aµi′/θ + ŝ
′
i, j and set
Ai, j = g
x′i, j g
−x′
i+2 j , j−1gbθ ŝ
′
i, j
= gxi, j g(−xi+2 j , j−1+abµi′ )gbθ(r
′
i, j−aµi′/θ)
= (gbθ )r
′
i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1
= Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1
Ã′i, j = g
aµi′/θ+ŝ
′
i, j = gr
′
i, j
(d) Else, Xi, j = 0 and Xi+2 j , j−1 = 0, so choose random r
′
i, j ∈ Zn with implicitly set xi, j =
x′i, j and xi+2 j , j−1 = x
′
i+2 j , j−1 and set
Ai, j = Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gx
′
i, j g
−x′
i+2 j , j−1
= Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1
Ãi, j = g
r′i, j
– Down. Together with the following values for i = 3 to l +1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c:
(a) If Xi, j = 1 and Xi, j−1 = 1, choose random r′′i, j ∈Zn with implicitly set xi, j = x′i, j +abµi′
and xi, j−1 = x′i, j−1 +abµi′ and set
Di, j = g
x′i, j g−x
′
i, j−1gz jr
′′
i, j = gxi, j g−xi, j−1gz jr
′′
i, j
D̃i, j = g
r′′i, j
(b) Else, if Xi, j = 1 and Xi, j−1 = 0, then the jth bit of l∗ is 1 by Observation 1c. Thus z j =
bv j, so choose random ŝ′′i, j ∈ Zn with implicitly set xi, j = x′i, j + abµi′ ,xi, j−1 = x′i, j−1,
and r′′i, j =−aµi′/v j + ŝ′′i, j and set
Di, j = g
x′i, j g−x
′
i, j−1gbv j ŝ
′′
i, j = gxi, j g−xi, j−1gz jr
′′
i, j
D̃i, j = g
−aµi′/v j+ŝ′′i, j = gr
′′
i, j
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(c) Else, if Xi, j = 0 and Xi, j−1 = 1, then the jth bit of l∗ is 1 by Observation 1d. Thus z j =
bv j, so choose random ŝ′′i, j ∈ Zn with implicitly set xi, j = x′i, j,xi, j−1 = x′i, j−1 + abµi′ ,
and r′′i, j = aµi′/v j + ŝ
′′
i, j and set
Di, j = g
x′i, j g−x
′
i, j−1gbv j ŝ
′′
i, j = gxi, j g−xi, j−1 gz jr
′′
i, j
D̃i, j = g
aµi′/v j+ŝ
′′
i, j = gr
′′
i, j
(d) Else, Xi, j = 0 and Xi, j−1 = 0, so choose random r′′i, j ∈ Zn with implicitly set xi, j = x′i, j
and xi, j−1 = x′i, j−1 and set
Di, j = g
x′i, j g−x
′
i, j−1gz jr
′′
i, j = gxi, j g−xi, j−1gz jr
′′
i, j
D̃i, j = g
r′′i, j
B returns
(
Ū ,Û ,Ũ ,{Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1,G,Bi, j, B̃i, j,Ai, j, Ãi, j,Di, j, D̃i, j
)
.
2. When t = 0 and m 6= m∗ (Type II Signature Generation):
Let l = |m|, and β = blg(l)c. l∗i denotes i-th bit of l∗ when we start counting with zero as the
least significant bit, and li denotes i-th bit of l.
Parse m∗ as m∗
β ∗m
∗
β ∗−1 · · ·m
∗
0 where m
∗
i is a string of length 2
i or a null string. mi is of length 2i
if li = 1, and is null otherwise. Similarly, Parse m as mβ mβ−1 · · ·m0.
B constructs (K, B̃,Zβ−1, · · · ,Z0) in the following way:
– If mβ 6= m∗β ∗ , then Hb(mβ ) = g
bη for a η which is known to B.
(a) B sets B̃ = g−aµi′/η+r for a randomly chosen r and K = gbηrU s.
(b) For j = β −1 down to 0, Z j = gr j for a ranodmly chosen r j, and
∗ If l j = 1, then K = K ·Ha(m j)r j .
∗ If l j = 0, then K = K ·gz jr j .
– Otherwise, if β = β ∗ and mβ = m∗β ∗ , there exists jŝ < β such that
∗ l jŝ 6= l∗jŝ , or
∗ l jŝ = l∗jŝ = 1 and Ha(m jŝ) 6= Ha(m
∗
jŝ).
so B can construct a signature (K, B̃,Zβ−1, · · · ,Z0) in the following way.
(a) B sets B̃ = grc for a randomly chosen rc and K = gηrcU s.
(b) For j = β −1 down to jŝ +1 and j = jŝ−1 to 0, Z j = gr j for randomly chosen r j, and
∗ If l j = 1, then K = K ·Ha(m j)r j .
∗ If l j = 0, then K = K ·gz jr j .
(c) For j = jŝ,
∗ If l j = 1, whether l∗j = 0 or not, B knows θ such that Ha(m j) = gbθ . B sets Z j =
g−aµi′/θ+r j for a randomly chosen r j, and K = K ·gbθr j .
∗ If l j = 0 and l∗j = 1, then B knows v such that gz j = gbv. B sets Z j = g−aµi′/v+r j for
a randomly chosen r j, and K = K ·gbvr j .
B returns
(
Ũ ,{Vk,πk1,πk2,πk3,πk4}dk=1,G,K, B̃,Zβ−1, · · · ,Z0
)
.
• Response Eventually, A outputs a valid signature σ∗ on M∗ = (t∗,m∗) on behalf of R∗. Recall that
l∗ = |m∗| and β = blg(l∗)c. Here l∗i denotes i-th bit of l∗ when we start counting with zero as the
least significant bit. Parse m∗ as m∗
β
m∗
β−1 · · ·m
∗
0 where m
∗
i is a string of length 2
i (when l∗i = 1) or a
null string (when l∗i = 0).
Because of the selective disclosure and setup, B knows the following exponents:
1. η such that Hb(m∗β ) = g
η .
2. θ j such that Ha(m∗ŝ j ,2 j) = g
θ j when l∗j = 1 and j 6= β .
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3. z j when l∗j = 0.
t∗ is either 1 or 0. As the challenger is given the factorization of n, this allows the challenger to
recover from a signature the values fk used in generating it. Therefore, the challenger knows the
actual signer of σ∗ and the corresponding µi′ in the H-List.
– If t∗ = 1,
ŝi denotes the position where m∗i starts. B can compute the information of some xi, j with the
following components of σ∗.
∗ B1,β = Hb(m∗β )
r1,β g
−x
1+2β ,β−1gabµi′U s, B̃1,β = g
r1,β
B knows η such that Hb(m∗β ) = g
η , so B can compute g−x1+2β ,β−1gabµi′U s = B1,β/B̃1,β
η
.
∗ For j = β −1 down to 0,
· when l j = 1,Aŝ j , j = Ha(m∗j)
r′ŝ j , j gxŝ j , j g−xŝ j−1 , j−1 , Ãŝ j , j = g
r′ŝ j , j
B knows θ such that Ha(m∗j) = gθ , so B can compute g
xŝ j , j g−xŝ j−1 , j−1 = Aŝ j , j/Ãŝ j , j
θ
.
· when l j = 0,Dŝ j , j = g
xŝ j , j g−xŝ j−1 , j−1g
z jr′′ŝ j , j , D̃ŝ j , j = g
r′′ŝ j , j
B knows z j, so B can compute g
xŝ j , j g−xŝ j−1, j−1 = Dŝ j , j/D̃ŝ j , j
z j .
so B can compute gxŝ j , j g−xŝ j−1 , j−1 .
B has the values of gxŝ j , j g−xŝ j−1 , j−1 for j = β − 1 down to 0 and g−x1+2β ,β−1gabµi′U s, so can
compute g
−x
1+2β ,β−1gabµi′U s
∏β−1
j=0 g
xŝ j , j g−xŝ j−1 , j−1 = gabµi′U sg−xs−1 ,−1 = gabµi′U s.
Then, B can compute gab =
(
(gabµi′U s)/Gp
)1/µi′ .
– If t∗ = 0,
B parses σ∗ as (K, B̃,Zβ−1, · · · ,Z0), with
B̃ = gc,Zβ−1 = g
cβ−1 , · · · ,Z0 = gc0
for some c,cβ−1, · · · ,c0 ∈ Zn.
K = gabµi′U s ·Hb(m∗β )
c
∏
j<β ,l∗j =1
Ha(m∗j)
c j
∏
j′<β ,l∗
j′=0
(gz j′ )c j′
because the signature is valid.
∗ B knows η such that Hb(m∗β ) = g
η . B sets N = B̃η .
∗ From j = β −1 down to 0, B proceeds as:
· If l j = 1, B knows θ j such that Ha(m∗j) = gθ j . B sets N = N ·Z
θ j
j ;
· If l j = 0, B knows z j. B sets N = N ·Z
z j
j .
Then
N = Hb(m∗β )
c
∏
j<β ,l∗j =1
Ha(m∗j)
c j
∏
j′<β ,l∗
j′=0
(gz j′ )c j′
so B can compute K/N = gabµi′U s.
Then, B can compute gab =
(
(gabµi′U s)/Gp
)1/µi′ .
Thus, whether t∗ is 1 or 0, B can solve for gab and correctly answer to the CDH challenge.
Theorem 4. This identity-based quotable ring signature scheme is strongly context hiding.
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PROOF. Given any two challenge messages M = (t,m),M′ = (t ′,m′) such that m′ is a substring of m,
we claim that whether t ′ = 1 or 0, σ ′ ← Quote(σ ,R,M,M′) has an identical distribution to that of σ ←
Sign(SIDi ,R,M
′), which implies that the two distributions are statistically close.
{
(
SIDi ,σ ← Sign(SIDi ,R,M),Sign(SIDi ,R,M
′)
)
}SIDi ,M,M′
{
(
SIDi ,σ ← Sign(SIDi ,R,M),Quote(σ ,R,M,M
′)
)
}SIDi ,M,M′
Let l, l′ denote |m| and |m′| respectively. Let Γ = min(blg(i−1)−1c,blg(l− i+1)c). Sign(SIDi ,R,M)
is composed of the following values:
• Ū = hu,Û = h1/u,Ũ = gu
• Vk = (QIDk/W ) fk hsk ,πk1 = hsku,πk2 =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1hsk
)1/u
,πk3 = gsku,πk4 = gsk , for each 1 ≤
k ≤ d
• G = Pspub = gαs, where s =
∑d
k=1 sk
• Bi, j = Hb(mi,2 j)ri, j g
−xi+2 j , j−1SID ·U s, B̃i, j = gri, j , for i = 1 to l and j = 0 to blg(l− i+1)c
• Ai, j =Ha(mi,2 j)
r′i, j gxi, j g−xi+2 j , j−1 , Ãi, j = g
r′i, j , for i= 3 to l and j = 0 to min(blg(i−1)−1c,blg(l−
i+1)c)
• Di, j = gxi, j g−xi, j−1gz j ·r
′′
i, j , D̃i, j = g
r′′i, j , for i = 3 to l +1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c
for randomly chosen u ∈ Z∗n and ri, j,r′i, j,r′′i, j,xi, j,sk ∈ Zn.
• Type I Signatures. Let Γ′ = min(blg(i−1)−1c,blg(l′− i+1)c). When t ′ = 1, Sign(SIDi ,R,M′) is
composed of the following values:
– Ū ′′ = hũ,Û ′′ = h1/ũ,Ũ ′′ = gũ
– V ′′k = (QIDk/W )
fk hs̃k ,π ′′k1 = h
s̃k ũ,π ′′k2 =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1hs̃k
)1/ũ
,π ′′k3 = g
s̃k ũ,π ′′k4 = g
s̃k , for each
1≤ k ≤ d
– G′′ = Ps̃pub = g
α s̃, where s̃ =
∑d
k=1 s̃k
– B′′i, j = Hb(m′i,2 j)
r̃i, j g−x̃i+2 j , j−1SID ·U s̃, B̃′′i, j = gr̃i, j , for i = 1 to l′ and j = 0 to blg(l′− i+1)c
– A′′i, j = Ha(m′i,2 j)
r̃′i, j gxi, j g−x̃i+2 j , j−1 , Ã′′i, j = g
r̃′i, j , for i = 3 to l′ and j = 0 to min(blg(i− 1)−
1c,blg(l′− i+1)c)
– D′′i, j = gx̃i, j g
−x̃i, j−1gz j ·r̃′′i, j , D̃′′i, j = g
r̃′′i, j , for i = 3 to l′+1 and j = 0 to blg(i−1)−1c
for randomly chosen ũ ∈ Z∗n and r̃i, j, r̃′i, j, r̃′′i, j, x̃i, j, s̃k ∈ Zn.
And Quote(σ ,R,M,M′) is Quote-Type I(σ ,R,m,m′), which is comprised of the following:
– Ū = huu′ ,Û = h1/uu′ ,Ũ = guu′
– Vk =(QIDk/W )
fk h(sk+s
′
k),πk1 = h(sk+s
′
k)uu
′
,πk2 =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1h(sk+s
′
k)
)1/uu′
,πk3 = g(sk+s
′
k)uu
′
,πk4 =
g(sk+s
′
k), for each 1≤ k ≤ d
– G = P(s+s
′)
pub = g
α(s+s′), where s =
∑d
k=1 sk,s
′ =
∑d
k=1 s
′
k
– Bi, j = Hb(m′i,2 j)
(rI, j+ti, j)g(−xI+2 j , j−1−yi+2 j , j−1)SID ·U (s+s
′), B̃i, j = g(rI, j+ti, j), for i = 1 to l and
j = 0 to blg(l− i+1)c
– Ai, j = Ha(m′i,2 j)
(r′I, j+t
′
i, j)g(xI, j+yi, j)g(−xI+2 j , j−1−yi+2 j , j−1), Ãi, j = g
(r′I, j+t
′
i, j), for i = 3 to l and j =
0 to min(blg(i−1)−1c,blg(l− i+1)c)
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– Di, j = g(xI, j+yi, j)g(−xI, j−1−yi, j−1)gz j ·(r
′′
I, j+t
′′
i, j), D̃i, j = g
(r′′I, j+t
′′
i, j), for i = 3 to l + 1 and j = 0 to
blg(i−1)−1c
for randomly chosen u′ ∈Z∗n and ti, j, t ′i, j, t ′′i, j,yi, j,s′k ∈Zn, where m′ occurs at position δ as a substring
of m, I = i+δ −1.
Since all exponents have been independently re-randomized, one can see by inspection that Quote
(σ ,R,M,M′) has identical distribution as that of Sign(SIDi ,R,M
′).
• Type II Signatures. Parse m′ = m′
β
m′
β−1 · · ·m
′
0 where m
′
j is of length 2
j or a null string where
β = blg(l′)c. l′i denotes i-th bit of l′ when we start counting with zero as the least significant bit.
m′ occurs at position δ of m. Sign(SIDi ,R,M
′) = (K, B̃,Zβ−1, · · · ,Z0) is the following, for random
u ∈ Z∗n,sk, û, ûi ∈ Zn:
– Ũ = gu
– Vk = (QIDk/W )
fk hsk ,πk1 = hsku,πk2 =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1hsk
)1/u
,πk3 = gsku,πk4 = gsk , for each
1≤ k ≤ d
– G = Pspub = g
αs, where s =
∑d
k=1 sk
– K = gabµi ·Hb(m′β )
û ·U s ·
∏
j<β ,l′j=1
Ha(m′j)
û j ·
∏
j′<β ,l′
j′=0
gz j′ û j′
– B̃ = gû,Z j = gû j
Let each m′j start at position ŝ j in m
′. Quote(σ ,R,M,M′)= Quote-Type II(σ ,R,m,m′) is (K, B̃′,Z′
β−1, · · · ,Z
′
0)
such that
– Ũ ′ = guu′
– V ′k =(QIDk/W )
fk h(sk+s
′
k),π ′k1 = h
(sk+s′k)uu
′
,π ′k2 =
(
(QIDk/W )
2 fk−1h(sk+s
′
k)
)1/uu′
,π ′k3 = g
(sk+s′k)uu
′
,π ′k4 =
g(sk+s
′
k), for each 1≤ k ≤ d
– G′ = P(s+s
′)
pub = g
α(s+s′), where s =
∑d
k=1 sk,s
′ =
∑d
k=1 s
′
k
– K′= gabµi ·Hb(m′β )
(rδ ,β+v) ·U (s+s′) ·
∏
j<β ,l′j=1
Ha(m′j)
(r′
δ+ŝ j−1, j
+v j) ·
∏
j′<β ,l′
j′=0
g
z j′ (r
′′
δ+ŝ j′ −1, j
′+v j′ )
– B̃′ = g(rδ ,β+v),(Z′j) j<β ,l′j=1 = g
(r′
δ+ŝ j−1, j
+v j)
,(Z′j′) j′<β ,l′j′=0
= g
(r′′
δ+ŝ j′ −1, j
′+v j′ )
for randomly chosen u′ ∈Z∗n,s′k,v,v j ∈Zn. Since all exponents have been independently re-randomized,
one can see by inspection that Quote(σ ,R,M,M′) has identical distribution as that of Sign(SIDi ,R,M
′).
Thus, this identity-based quotable ring signature scheme is strongly context hiding.
6. Conclusion
We introduced a new notion of identity-based quotable ring signature based on bilinear paring in com-
posite order groups. We extended the quotable signature to an identity-based ring signature scenario. Using
this cryptographic primitive, anyone could derive new ring signatures on a substring of an original message
from a ring signature on the original message. There are two different types of ring signatures. The first
one could be quoted further down to these two types of signature. The other one could not be quoted any
further, but will be a shorter signature. We also proved that our scheme is anonymous under the assumption
that the Subgroup Decision Problem is hard, selectively unforgeable against adaptively chosen message at-
tacks in the random oracle model under the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is
hard, and strongly context hiding.
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[21] J. Herranz and G. Sáez. A provably secure id-based ring signature scheme. In eprint. Citeseer, 2003.
[22] R. Johnson, D. Molnar, D. Song, and D. Wagner. Homomorphic signature schemes. In B. Preneel, editor, Topics in Cryptology
CT-RSA 2002, volume 2271 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 244–262. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2002.
[23] C.-Y. Lin and T.-C. Wu. An identity-based ring signature scheme from bilinear pairings. In 2013 IEEE 27th International
Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA), volume 2, pages 182–182. IEEE Computer Society,
2004.
[24] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and Y. Tauman. How to leak a secret. In C. Boyd, editor, Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT 2001,
volume 2248 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 552–565. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001.
[25] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and Y. Tauman. How to leak a secret: Theory and applications of ring signatures. In O. Goldreich,
A. Rosenberg, and A. Selman, editors, Theoretical Computer Science, volume 3895 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 164–186. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006.
[26] H. Shacham and B. Waters. Efficient ring signatures without random oracles. In T. Okamoto and X. Wang, editors, Public Key
Cryptography PKC 2007, volume 4450 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 166–180. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2007.
[27] A. Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In G. Blakley and D. Chaum, editors, Advances in Cryptology,
volume 196 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 47–53. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1985.
[28] C. Tang, Z. Liu, and M. Wang. An improved identity-based ring signature scheme from bilinear pairings. NM Research
Preprints, pages 231–234, 2003.
21
[29] F. Zhang and K. Kim. Id-based blind signature and ring signature from pairings. In Y. Zheng, editor, Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT 2002, volume 2501 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 533–547. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2002.
22
